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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Republic of Singapore is an economic leader in Southeast Asia, with a vibrant information 
and communications technologies sector; however, the state maintains strong formal and informal 
controls over the information to which its citizens have access.
1  Singapore’s official position is that the 
state filters Internet content to promote social values and maintain national unity,
2 with the goal of 
denying access to objectionable material, especially pornography and content encouraging ethnic or 
religious strife.  The Media Development Authority (MDA) claims to block only a symbolic list of 100 Web 
sites (primarily pornography) as a symbol of the state’s disapproval of this content.  In addition, the MDA 
encourages, and each of Singapore’s three primary Internet Service Providers offers, optional, filtered 
Internet access services that block additional sites for a minimal monthly fee.
3 
In our testing, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI)
4 found extremely minimal filtering of Internet 
content in Singapore, as only eight sites of 1,632 tested (.49%) were blocked: www.cannabis.com, 
www.chick.com, www.formatureaudiencesonly.com, www.penthouse.com, www.persiankitty.com, 
www.playboy.com, www.playgirl.com, and www.sex.com.  The limited blocking that our testing revealed 
focuses on a few pornographic URLs and one site each in the categories of illegal drugs and fanatical 
religion.  Similar content is readily available at other sites on the Internet that are not blocked in 
Singapore.  Thus, Singapore’s Internet content regulation depends primarily on access controls (such as 
requiring political sites to register for a license) and legal pressures (such as defamation lawsuits and the 
threat of imprisonment) to prevent people from posting objectionable content rather than technological 
methods to block it.  Compared to other countries that implement mandatory filtering regimes that ONI 
has studied closely, Singapore’s technical filtering system is one of the most limited. 
 
 
                         
1 See U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Singapore (August 2004), at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm. 
2 See Media Development Authority, Internet, at http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161; 
Randolph Kluver and Ang Peng Hwa, “Legal Issues for Online Journalism in Singapore,” presented at “IT Community 
and New Media Journalism in Asia: Legal Problems and Perspectives Conference”, Hanoi (October 2004). 
3 See Media Development Authority, Internet – Family Access Network, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161#3 (last updated Jan. 20, 2005); SingTel, SingNet Value 
Added Services – Filtering Service, at 
http://home.singtel.com/consumer/products/internet/singnet_value_added_services/filtering_service_overview.asp 
(last visited July 18, 2005); StarHub, Value-added Services: SafeSurf, at 
http://www.starhub.com/online/valueaddedservices/safesurf/index.html; Pacific Internet, Cyber Guard Family Access, 
at http://www.pacific.net.sg/article.php?id=1854 (last visited July 18, 2005). 
4 The OpenNet Initiative wishes to thank the Singapore Internet Research Centre at the School of Communication 
and Information, Nanyang Technological University, and in particular Professors Randolph Kluver and Ang Peng 
Hwa, and Research Associate Shahiraa Sahul Hameed, for their assistance in the preparation of this study.  ONI also 
thanks a reviewer from Singapore who prefers to remain anonymous. Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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2. POLITICAL, TECHNICAL, AND LEGAL CONTEXT IN SINGAPORE 
 
 
A. Sensitive / Controversial Topics for Media Coverage 
  Singapore restricts media coverage of topics both formally and informally.  According to a recent 
censorship review by a government-appointed committee, access should be denied to content that 
“undermines public order and the nation’s security, denigrates race and religion, or erodes moral values.”
5  
In evaluating moral values, the committee defined as “clearly immoral and demeaning” content that 
includes “pornography, deviant sexual practices, sexual violence, child pornography, [and] bestiality.”
6  It 
noted, though, a range of opinion in Singapore on “violence, nudity and homosexuality,”
7 recommending 
in particular that the ban on homosexual content be eased.
8  (This may be because Singapore has become 
a hub for gay culture in Asia.
9)  The first category, protecting public order and national security, is quite 
vague; dissidents allege that the state has used similar language in its Internal Security Act to deter 
political protest and hinder opposition parties.
10  Defamation lawsuits against dissidents and news 
organizations are also used as a method of control.
11  Singapore views discussion of religious and ethnic 
issues as risky given the background of its population; these topics must be approached carefully in public 
discourse.
12  The state is also concerned about Islamic extremist groups such as Jemaah Islamiah.
13 
 
B. Internet Infrastructure and Access 
Singapore has achieved tremendous Internet penetration.  In 2002, 61% of the population of 
Singapore had access to the Internet from home, work, or cybercafés.
14  Three firms provide Internet 
access for most of the state’s 2.31 million subscribers
15: StarHub, SingTel’s SingNet, and Pacific Internet.
16   
                         
5 Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, Censorship Review Committee: Report of 2003 15, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.316.Censorship_Review_2003.pdf.  
6 Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, Censorship Review Committee: Report of 2003 26. 
7 Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, Censorship Review Committee: Report of 2003 26. 
8 Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, Censorship Review Committee: Report of 2003 32 
(proposing “greater leeway to non-exploitative theme or scenes for adults through suitable channels”). 
9 See Gordon Fairclough, For Its Own Reasons, Singapore Is Getting Rather Gay-Friendly, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 
22, 2004, at A1. 
10 See Hannah K. Strange, Opposition: Singapore Democracy “a Myth,” Washington Times, July 1, 2004, at 
http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040630-120235-5420r.htm. 
11 Strange, Opposition: Singapore Democracy “a Myth,”; see also Michael Dwyer, Singapore’s accidental exiles leave 
a damning vacuum, South China Morning Post, Sept. 2, 2004, at 16. 
12 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Singapore, January 2005 Updater (Jan. 1, 2005). 
13 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Singapore. 
14 Asia Internet Usage Stats and 2005 Population Statistics, at http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm (citing 
International Telecommunication Union data); see also InfoComm Development Authority, Statistics on Telecom 
Services for 2004 (Jul. – Dec.), at 
http://www.ida.gov.sg/idaweb/factfigure/infopage.jsp?infopagecategory=factsheet:factfigure&versionid=1&infopageid=
I3060 (listing 1,720,700 Internet dial-up subscribers and 497,100 broadband subscribers). 
15 See CIA, The World Factbook – Singapore, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sn.html.  Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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While all three Internet Service Providers are public entities, the government was the majority 
shareholder in each as of April 2001.
17  Whether a viable independent Internet access provider is possible 
in Singapore remains in question. 
 
C. General Media Regulation 
Singapore lacks a free and independent press.  According to one group of observers at the 
University of Hong Kong, the Singapore media is used as a “semi-official bridge between the government 
and the public.”
18  The University of Hong Kong report found overwhelming evidence that the state owns 
an equity stake in the press and broadcast conglomerates it supports.
19  Singapore fiercely criticized a 
report by Reporters Sans Frontières, which ranked the state at 147th in its annual Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index — by far the lowest ranking of any wealthy, developed nation.
20  The committee chartered 
with reviewing Singapore’s censorship laws urged the state to reduce censorship in June 2003, and the 
state has accepted the committee’s recommendations.  Formal action to control content is frequent; 
Singapore recently imposed sanctions on a radio station for broadcasting sexual content and on a print 
journalist for reporting on a foreign trip by the former prime minister’s wife for medical treatment.
21 
Media ownership is carefully monitored by the government, which exerts influence over content 
through investment and informal ties.  Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), a company with close ties to the 
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), controls all of Singapore’s daily newspapers.
22  The Media Corporation 
of Singapore (Mediacorp), which is owned by a state investment agency and controlled by PAP 
                                                                           
16 See Singtel, About SingTel, at http://home.singtel.com/about_singtel/company_profile/default.asp; Pacific Internet, 
Corporate Profile, at http://www.pacnet.com/aboutus/Corporate%20Profile/; and StarHub, About Us: Company 
Information, at http://www.starhub.com/corporate/aboutus/index.html. 
17 International Telecommunication Union, The Info-Communications Development Authority (IDA): A Case Study on 
Singapore’s “Converged” Regulatory Agency, available at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-d/publicat/sgp_c_st.pdf (last 
visited November 2004). 
18 Chu Yee-ling & Wong Man-yee, Asia Media Project – Singapore, Journalism and Media Studies Centre: University 
of Hong Kong, at http://jmsc.hku.hk/students/jmscjournal/critical/elainandmargaret_02.htm.  For an alternative 
discussion of media, see James Gomez, So Who is Watching the Media in Singapore?, Oct. 11, 2001, at 
http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/article.php?AID=151.  
19 Chu Yee-ling & Wong Man-yee, Asia Media Project – Singapore; see also International Telecommunication Union, 
Effective Regulation Case Study: Singapore 2001 7, at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-d/publicat/sgp_c_st.html (providing 
a diagram of governmental control of the Singaporean telecom industry). 
20 See Reporters Sans Frontières, Third Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index, at 
http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=11715; see also Agence France-Presse, Lee Kuan Yew warns foreign media 
not to meddle in Singapore, Dec. 21, 2004 (reporting the former prime minister’s critique of the Reporters Sans 
Frontières rating). 
21 Reporters Sans Frontières, Singapore – 2004 Annual Report. 
22 BBC News, Country Profile: Singapore, at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1143240.stm#media (last updated Jan. 14, 2005); see 
Reporters Sans Frontières, Singapore – 2004 Annual Report. Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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supporters, dominates the broadcasting media.
23  Mediacorp and SPH merged partially in late 2004, 
reducing greatly media competition in newspapers and television.
24 
Formally, the Media Development Authority (MDA), which was created on Jan. 1, 2003 (formerly 
the Singapore Broadcasting Authority), is the agency responsible for media regulation.  The MDA’s 
primary authority derives from the Media Development Authority of Singapore Act
25 that established it; 
however, other laws, notably those relating to pornography and election material, have been applied to 
the Internet and users.  Overall, the state influences newspaper editorial decisions through its links to the 
SPH,
26 and television programming is controlled and censored by the MDA.
27 
An important, informal means of media control in Singapore is the use of lawsuits under the 
state’s stringent defamation laws.
28  Defamation suits in Singapore are a common tactic for controlling 
speech, especially that related to Singapore’s government and politics; defendants who lose such suits 
often face hundreds of thousands of dollars in liability.
29  There have been repeated allegations that judges 
in political defamation cases are linked to – and favor – government officials.
30  Self-censorship by the 
media is common since the standard of proof in a defamation suit is easily met -- the burden rests upon 
the defendant to prove the truth of the statements (absent a claim of privilege, which is quite limited in 
scope) by substantial evidence, without the benefit of a jury trial.
31  Thus, “The law of defamation 
presumes that defamatory words are false and the plaintiff need do no more than prove that the 
defamatory words have been published by the defendant. The burden is then on the defendant, if he 
                         
23 See Reporters Sans Frontières, Singapore – 2004 Annual Report; see also James Gomez, The Control and 
Censorship of Political Expression in the Singapore Media, July 27, 2004, at 
http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/article.php?AID=133; Seah Chiang Lee, It’s Back to Media Monopoly, 
ThinkCentre.org, at http://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=2458 (Oct. 3, 2004).  
24 Lee, It’s back to media monopoly; see Singapore Press Holdings, Mediacorp and Singapore Press Holdings Merge 
Their TV and Free Newspaper Operations, Sept. 17, 2004, at http://www.sph.com.sg/news/latest/files/ceosupp.pdf. 
25 Media Development Authority of Singapore Act, Jan. 1, 2003, available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-
172&doctitle=MEDIA%20DEVELOPMENT%20AUTHORITY%20OF%20SINGAPORE%20ACT%0a&date=latest&met
hod=part. 
26 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Singapore 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004), at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27788.htm. 
27 See Media Development Authority, Free-to-Air Television Programme Code, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.612.fta_tv_prog_code.pdf; Broadcasting Act (2002) § 8, at 
http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_getdata.pl?actno=2003-REVED-
28&doctitle=BROADCASTING%20ACT%0a&date=latest&method=part&segid=1059635718-000242#1059635718-
000245. 
28 See Defamation Act, available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-
75&date=latest&method=part. 
29 See, e.g., Courts take aim at dissidents, Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia), Mar. 13, 1997, at 15 (noting that two 
opposition politicians in Singapore each paid over $400,000 in damages in defamation suits); Paul Bentley, The 
Politics of Defamation in Singapore, Provincial Judges Journal, Autumn 1997, available at http://www.singapore-
window.org/80217can.htm; Eric Ellis, Singapore Authorities use Libel Laws to Silence Critics, The Australian, Sept. 
26, 2002, available at http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/02Pf/aus260902.html. 
30 See, e.g., Courts take aim at dissidents, Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia); Amnesty International, Singapore: 
Defamation suits threaten Chee Soon Juan and erode freedom of expression, Nov. 2, 2001, at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA360102001?open&of=ENG-SGP; Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan 
(No 2) [2005] 1 SLR 552 (awarding Yew, former Senior Minister of Singapore, $200,000 in a defamation suit against 
Juan, Secretary-General of the Singapore Democratic Party). 
31 See, e.g., Carolyn Hong, Vindicating Dented Reputations, New Straits Times (Malaysia), Nov. 26, 2000, at 9 
(noting that Singapore’s defamation trials do not involve juries). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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wishes to rely on the defence of justification, to prove that those words are true.”
32  The United States 
Department of State has condemned the scope and effect of Singapore’s defamation laws, stating that 
“government pressure to conform resulted in the practice of self censorship… [law]suits, which have 
consistently been decided in favor of government plaintiffs, chilled political speech and action and created 
a perception that the ruling party used the judicial system for political purposes.”
33 
A recent example that demonstrates the reach of these laws, and their effects on Internet 
communication, targeted a blogger studying at the University of Illinois.  Jiahoa Chen, a Singapore 
citizen, was forced to shut down his blog “caustic.soda”
34 (hosted on the university’s server) under threat 
of a defamation lawsuit from A*STAR (Agency for Science, Technology, and Research), a state-funded 
agency that provides scholarships to Singaporeans studying abroad in return for a commitment to public 
service after graduation.
35  Chen broke his contractual agreement with A*STAR and had to repay his 
scholarship to the agency.
36  Subsequently, he criticized A*STAR in an interview with Singapore’s The 
Electric New Paper and also on his blog.  Chen stated that A*STAR treats its students “merely [as] a 
human resource”
37 and that the agency’s recently instituted 3.8 grade point average requirement for 
maintaining scholarship funding was “unnecessarily draconian and counterproductive.”
38  Shortly 
thereafter, A*STAR chairman Philip Yeo sent a series of e-mail messages to Chen threatening legal action 
and demanding the immediate removal of the blog.
39  Under the threat of a defamation suit, Chen closed 
his blog, issuing a statement that “the price of maintaining the content that used to be available at this 
URL has become too high for the author to afford.”
40  Following continued pressure from Yeo and 
A*STAR, Chen later posted a more explicit apology that reads, “I admit and acknowledge that these 
statements are false and completely without any foundation. I unreservedly apologize to A*STAR, its 
Chairman Mr. Philip Yeo, and its executive officers for the distress and embarrassment caused to them by 
these statements.”
41  Chen’s case reinforces the power of Singapore’s defamation laws to alter Internet 
content and has led other Singaporean bloggers to write more cautiously.
42 
                         
32 Arul Chandran v. Chew Chin Aik Victor JP, [2001] 1 SLR 505 at 513. 
33 U.S. Department of State, Singapore: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004, Feb. 28, 2005, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41659.htm. 
34 Chen’s blog, caustic.soda, is currently available at http://www.scs.uiuc.edu/~chen6/blog/.  A screen shot of the blog 
as it appeared on the first day it was shut down is available at http://photos8.flickr.com/11195062_6e3edac422.jpg. 
35 See A*STAR, About A*STAR, at http://www.a-star.edu.sg/astar/about/action/scholarships.do (describing the 
Message to A*Star Scholars). 
36 See Why Bond Breakers Left, Electronic New Paper, Apr. 5, 2005, at 
http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/printfriendly/0,4139,86038,00.html. 
37 See, e.g., AcidFlask’s Story, Singabloodypore, May 6, 2005, at 
http://singabloodypore.blogspot.com/2005/05/acidflasks-story.html. 
38 See Why Bond Breakers Left, Electronic New Paper.. 
39 See Ansley Ng, Student shuts blog after A*Star threatens to sue, Singapore News, May 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.todayonline.com/articles/49008.asp. 
40 See the screen shot of caustic.soda available at http://photos8.flickr.com/11195062_6e3edac422.jpg. 
41 See caustic.soda, Apology, at http://www.scs.uiuc.edu/~chen6/blog/. 
42 See, e.g., A Sad Day for the Singapore Blogosphere, Blogger, Apr. 25, 2005, at  
http://singaporeangle.blogspot.com/2005/04/sad-day-for-singapore-blogosphere.html (expressing views of over 30 
bloggers). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
  8 
 
D. Internet Access Regulation 
The Singapore Broadcasting Act requires Internet access service providers (IASPs), political 
parties, Internet service resellers (ISRs), Internet Content Providers (ICPs), and entities with Web sites 
related to political or religious topics to register with the MDA under a class license scheme.
43  Under the 
law, both service and content providers
44 are required to comply with the Internet Code of Practice, which 
“outlines what the community regards as offensive or harmful to Singapore’s racial and religious 
harmony.”
45  Political parties, religious groups, or individuals discussing these topics on their Web sites 
must “provide the [MDA] with such particulars and undertakings as the Authority may require.”
46  ISPs 
(comprising ISRs and IASPs) must conform to terms of the Class License
47 that mandate enforcing 
compliance with the MDA’s Internet Code of Practice.
48  In addition, the license requires that all sites 
providing material about or hosting discussions regarding political
49 or religious topics register with the 
MDA and conform to MDA requests regarding that content.
50  Thus, Singapore has erected barriers to 
creating Internet content that augment its regulations for content itself. 
                         
43 Broadcasting Act, available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-
297&date=latest&method=part; see Media Development Authority, Internet Service Providers, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=222. 
44 The Media Development Authority defines Internet service providers as “Internet Access Service Providers (IASPs) 
who function as main "gateways" to the Internet, and Internet Service Resellers who obtain Internet access from the 
IASPs and resell such access to the public.”  The MDA notes that "the main local IASPs are SingNet, Pacific Internet 
and Starhub Internet" while "Internet Service Resellers include schools, public libraries, cybercafés and service 
providers such as the Singapore Network Services Pte Ltd and National Computer Services Pte Ltd."  Internet 
Content Providers are defined as “information providers on the World Wide Web... [who] include web authors and 
editors, web publishers and web server administrators.”  Media Development Authority, Internet Industry Guide, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.496.internet_industry_guide.pdf. 
45 Media Development Authority, Internet. 
46 § 6(b), ¶ 4, Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification, July 15, 1996, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicence.pdf.  For two accounts of how the political opposition 
reacted to the restrictions, see Yawning Bread, Government Tightens Control Over Political Websites, August 2001, 
at http://www.yawningbread.org/arch_2001/yax-244.htm, and Alfred Siew, Speaking Your Mind Online Without Fear, 
Computer Times, Aug. 22, 2001, at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw01/010822ct.htm. 
47 Media Development Authority, Internet Service Providers. 
48 Media Development Authority, Internet Code of Practice, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.497.internet_code.pdf. 
49 The MDA has established a specific set of restrictions regarding the use of the Internet by political parties and 
candidates. See, e.g., Randolph Kluver, Political Culture and Information Technology in the 2001 Singapore General 
Election, 21 Political Communication 435 (2004). 
50 See Media Development Authority, Myths and Facts about the MDA and the Internet, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.633.internet_facts&myths.pdf; see also Media Development Authority, 
Internet Service Providers (noting that political parties and “Individuals, groups, organisations and corporations 
engaged in providing any programme for the propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues 
relating to Singapore on the World Wide Web through the Internet” must register with the MDA and obtain a license). 
Some sites containing political content, particularly content critical of the government, are hosted overseas to avoid 
governmental restrictions. To date, there has been little effort by the government to restrict this practice or to block 
access to these sites. Kluver and Hwa, “Legal Issues for Online Journalism in Singapore.” Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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E. Internet Content Regulation 
Singapore has regulated Internet content since 1996.
51  The state claims to use a “light-touch” 
approach to regulation.
52  The primary legal instrument establishing control over access to Internet 
content is the Broadcasting Act.  Under the Act, the MDA has authority to require the blocking of specific 
external sites or domains and to mandate the removal or moderation of “objectionable” content hosted by 
service or content providers by issuing a Code of Practice.  The MDA’s Internet Code of Practice defines 
prohibited content, which ISPs must block, as that which depicts nudity in a titillating fashion; promotes 
sexual violence; shows people engaged in explicit sexual activity; advocates homosexuality or lesbianism; 
shows sexual activity by a person who is or appears to be less than 16 years old; depicts incest, bestiality, 
pedophilia, or necrophilia; depicts extreme violence or cruelty; or “glorifies, incites or endorses ethnic, 
racial or religious hatred, strife or intolerance.”
53  In practice, the MDA claims to have established a 
“symbolic” list of 100 sites that are officially blocked; persons attempting to view any site on this list will 
be informed that the site in question is blocked.
54  The MDA states these sites are primarily well-known 
pornographic domains.
55  As discussed below, ONI’s testing calls this statement into question; we found 
only eight sites filtered at any point in our testing, including one illegal drugs site and one site devoted to 
Christian evangelism. 
The MDA can issue penalties for violations, including fines or a license suspension or termination 
for non-compliance.  Corporate Internet access is exempt from the requirement to block these 100 sites 
prohibited under the MDA Class License.
56  The MDA has encouraged ISPs to develop and offer Family 
Access Networks that filter out pornographic and other objectionable Web sites for an additional fee; fees 
for this service were roughly $3 Singapore per month in July 2005.
57  The government has encouraged the 
development of a ratings system and filtering software but has not yet publicly announced the adoption or 
endorsement of any such system or software.
58 
In addition to explicit attempts to block pornography, hate speech, and similar content, the 
MDA’s predecessor (the Singapore Broadcasting Authority, or SBA) was accused by members of the 
political opposition of using its authority to disrupt the PAP’s political opponents and to suppress 
dissent.
59  For example, during the 2001 parliamentary elections, the SBA was accused of selectively 
                         
51 See Rose Aguilar, Singapore law restricts Internet, CNET News.com, July 11, 1996, at http://news.com.com/2100-
1023-217236.html?legacy=cnet; see also Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification, July 15, 1996, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicence.pdf. 
52 Media Development Authority, Internet. 
53 Media Development Authority, Internet Code of Practice. 
54 Personal communication with the authors. 
55 Personal communication with the authors; see generally Media Development Authority, Myths and Facts about the 
MDA and the Internet. 
56 Personal communication with the authors. 
57 Personal communication with the authors; see Media Development Authority, Internet - Family Access Network. 
58 See Media Development Authority, Internet. 
59 See James Gomez, Politics on the Internet, Oct. 19, 2001, at 
http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/article.php?AID=81; but see Media Development Authority, Myths and Facts About 
the MDA and the Internet (denying that the MDA takes such action). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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applying electoral laws to registered opposition Web sites.
60  The SBA was also criticized for its treatment 
of fateha.com, a Muslim site that protested the ban on Muslim students wearing head scarves.
 61  In 
addition, the Computer Misuse Act and e-commerce legislation adopted in 1998 give Singapore’s police 
wide powers to seize and search computers without a warrant and to decrypt online messages.
62 
The Internet Code of Practice does not provide for any restrictions or penalties imposed on users; 
however, violation of other laws, such as those banning possession of pornography, may subject an 
Internet user to criminal penalties.  In addition, the government has been accused of manufacturing 
charges against political dissidents and of monitoring the Internet use of suspected dissidents
63; the 
Computer Misuse Act and similar legislation have greatly increased the government’s authority to 
monitor and decrypt Internet content.  Even if few such charges are filed, the threat thereof may serve to 
deter political opposition in Singapore. 
In addition to filtering that occurs under the mandates of the MDA, other providers of Internet 
access (such as universities) implement blocking of sites as well.  Like the MDA, these providers generally 
do not reveal which sites are blocked or the precise rationale for filtering the sites to which access is 
prevented.
64 
 
3. TESTING METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A. Methods 
  ONI performs technical testing across multiple levels of access at multiple time intervals.  The 
team analyzes results within the contextual framework of the target state’s filtering technology and 
regulations.  To obtain meaningful, accurate results we:  
 
•  generate lists of domain names and URLs that have been or are likely to be blocked; 
•  enumerate ISPs and national routing topography; 
•  determine the type, location, and behavior of the filtering technology; 
•  deploy network interrogation and enumeration software at multiple access points; and 
•  conduct a thorough statistical analysis of results. 
 
                         
60 See, e.g., Committee to Protect Journalists, Asia 2001: Singapore, at 
http://www.cpj.org/attacks01/asia01/singapore.html.  
61 James Gomez, Internet Politics: Surveillance & Intimidation in Singapore (2002). 
62 See Computer Misuse Act § 15, at http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-
50A&doctitle=COMPUTER%20MISUSE%20ACT%0a&date=latest&method=part; Electronic Transactions Act § 53, at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_getdata.pl?actno=1999-REVED-
88&doctitle=ELECTRONIC%20TRANSACTIONS%20ACT%0a&date=latest&method=part&segid=946437974-
000962#946437974-001008; see generally Reporters Sans Frontières, Internet: Singapore, at 
http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=10771. 
63 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Singapore 2004. 
64 Personal communication with the authors. Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
  11 
  Determining which URLs to test is a vital component of our research, as it reveals the filtering 
system’s technical capacity and content areas subject to blocking.  ONI employs three types of lists: 
 
•  a list of “high impact” sites reported to be blocked or likely to be blocked in the state of concern 
due to their content (for example, political opposition); 
•  a “global list” containing a control list of manually categorized Web sites reflecting a range of  
Internet content (for example, news and hacking sites); and 
•  a list of sites with material related to separatist, military, paramilitary, intelligence, and political 
organizations. 
 
  To explore Internet filtering, we deploy network interrogation devices and applications, which 
perform the censorship enumeration, at various Internet access levels.  These tools download the ONI 
testing lists and check whether specific URLs and domains are accessible from that point on the network.  
Interrogation devices are designed to run inside a state (i.e., behind its firewall) to perform specific, 
sensitive functions with varying degrees of stealth.  Similarly, ONI distributes interrogation applications 
to trusted volunteers who run the software inside the state.  For testing, ONI obtains network access at 
multiple levels through: 
 
•  Proxy servers, 
•  Long distance dial-up, 
•  Distributed applications, and 
•  Dedicated servers. 
 
  During initial testing, we use remote computers located in countries that filter.  These remote 
computers are located behind the state’s firewalls yet allow access to clients connecting from the wider 
Internet.  We attempt to access the URL and domain name lists through these computers to reveal what 
content is filtered, and how consistently it is blocked.  ONI also tests these lists from control locations in 
non-filtered states.  The testing system flags all URLs and domains that are accessible from the control 
location, but inaccessible from ones inside the target state, as potentially blocked. 
 
B. Results Analysis 
We carefully analyze the data obtained from testing to document the nature of filtered content, to 
explore the technical capabilities of the target state, and to determine areas that require in-depth study 
during internal testing.  In particular, ONI examines the response received over HTTP when attempting to 
access filtered content.  As discussed, when content is filtered, users often receive a “block page” – a Web 
page with text indicating that the requested content cannot be accessed.
65 In other cases, filtering can be 
less obvious or transparent, appearing to be network errors, redirections, or lengthy timeouts rather than 
deliberate blocking.  We analyze HTTP headers – text sent from the Web server to the browser – to derive 
information about both the server and the requested page.  This information is generally hidden from the 
end user.  However, these headers indicate whether content was successfully accessed or was inaccessible.  
                         
65 See Internet Censorship Explorer, Blockpage.com, at http://www.blockpage.com/gallery/ (defining a block page 
and providing examples). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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If an error occurs, the HTTP protocol returns codes that indicate the type of error in the header.  Thus, by 
analyzing the headers captured during testing, we can distinguish between errors caused by Internet 
filtering and more mundane, unintentional network connection errors. 
  We classify results in one of four categories: 
 
•  URL is accessible both through the local connection and the remote computer (not filtered); 
•  URL is accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer, 
which returned a different HTTP response code (possibly filtered); 
•  URL is accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer due 
to a network connection error (possibly filtered, but not definitive); or 
•  URL is accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer; the 
remote computer returns a block page (filtered). 
 
  If a URL is inaccessible through both the local connection and the remote computer, we consider 
it “dead” and remove it from the results. 
  The ONI team analyzes blocked, unblocked, and uncertain URLs both at an aggregate level (to 
estimate the overall level of filtering) and at a category level (to indicate what types of content the state 
seeks to control).  We publish country studies that provide background on a state’s political and legal 
system, lists of tested sites, and analysis of results to reveal and analyze what information a state blocks 
and how it does so.  We note, however, that our results and analysis capture a “snapshot” of a state’s 
filtering system for a specific point or period of time; governments can and do alter the content they block 
dynamically. 
 
C. Methods Specific to Singapore 
To evaluate Singapore’s filtering, we tested four lists (the global list, a high-impact list designed 
for Singapore, a list focused on separatist and paramilitary organizations, and a sub-set of the global and 
high impact lists targeting sites most likely to be filtered) from access points on four network providers 
(Pacific, QALA,
66 SingNet, and StarHub) and one major Singapore university over a seven-month period.  
We used two forms of network access: direct in-state testing on broadband connections by trusted 
volunteers and remote access to proxy servers. 
For direct testing, we had volunteers in Singapore run a series of tests from within the state.
67  
These tests used the software application developed by ONI to examine filtering.  The volunteers ran two 
tests of the global list (one test each on StarHub and SingNet broadband connections), one test of the 
high-impact list (on StarHub), and three tests of a sub-set of the high-impact and global lists (one test 
each on StarHub, SingNet, and at a major Singapore university).  This testing of the sub-set checked 14 
URLs, including each URL that our proxy server testing reported as filtered. 
                         
66 QALA is a Singapore ISP; we believe that QALA re-sells Internet access from one of the three primary ISPs in 
Singapore (Pacific, SingNet, and Starhub).  See QALA, About QALA, at http://www.qala.com.sg/main_aboutus.htm. 
67 ONI extends its sincere appreciation and gratitude to these volunteers, who remain anonymous as a safety 
precaution. Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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For remote testing, we tested nine proxy servers from seven organizations that connect to four 
network providers (Pacific, QALA,
68 SingNet, and StarHub).  Results from these proxy servers varied 
greatly from one to the next.  The Pacific server, the QALA server, one SingNet server, and two Starhub 
servers did not filter any Web sites.  Two Starhub servers and one SingNet server did filter sites.  The 
Starhub servers redirected us to a block page when we attempted to access a filtered site.
69  The SingNet 
server uses the SurfControl filtering software to limit access to Web content.
70 
ONI did not test the optional, “family access” services that filter Internet content more heavily 
that are offered by Singapore’s three main ISPs.71  Users in Singapore can decide whether to use these 
filtered services; ONI’s primary research goal is to analyze and describe state-mandated filtering regimes. 
 
D. Topics Tested 
ONI tested topics to which the Singapore government has demonstrated sensitivity.  These 
include pornographic content, gay / lesbian / bisexual materials, dissident and political opposition sites, 
commentary and news pages, religious and evangelical content, illegal drugs sites, non-governmental 
organizations, ethnicity pages, and sites that could be mistaken for pornography. 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
A. Summary 
Singapore’s Internet filtering is minimal.  ONI found only eight sites blocked during any of our 
testing, six of which were pornographic (www.formatureaudiencesonly.com, www.penthouse.com, 
www.persiankitty.com, www.playboy.com, www.playgirl.com, www.sex.com), one of which was a site 
devoted to Christian evangelism that preaches against “false religions” (www.chick.com)
72, and one of 
which related to marijuana use (www.cannabis.com).  Even these eight sites were not blocked consistently 
across all ISPs.  Six sites were blocked in at least one-third of our tests: four sites (www.penthouse.com, 
www.persiankitty.com, www.playboy.com, and www.sex.com) were blocked in at least 60% of our tests; 
www.cannabis.com was blocked in almost 40% of our tests; and www.playgirl.com was blocked in roughly 
35% of our tests.  This variation is not unexpected when ISPs are responsible for implementing filtering; 
                         
68 QALA is a Singapore ISP; we believe that QALA re-sells Internet access from one of the three primary ISPs in 
Singapore (Pacific, SingNet, and Starhub).  See QALA, About QALA, at http://www.qala.com.sg/main_aboutus.htm. 
69 See Figure 1 in Appendix 3 for a copy of the Starhub block page. 
70 See SurfControl, Products – Web Filter – SurfControl Internet Filtering Software, at 
http://www.surfcontrol.com/Default.aspx?id=375&mnuid=1.1. 
71 See Media Development Authority, Internet – Family Access Network, at 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161#3 (last updated Jan. 20, 2005). 
72 This site states in its Frequently Asked Questions that “The world contains numerous religions, each teaching a 
different god. These gods are not the same, and therefore cannot all be the Creator. True Christianity is based upon 
the Bible, the historically verifiable record of what God did in history… We are unwilling to lie to [people of other 
religions] and say that all gods are real, when we know this is not true.”  FAQ’s concerning Chick Publications, at 
http://www.chick.com/information/general/chickinfo.asp (last visited July 13, 2005). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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different providers implement filtering with different levels of success and rigor.  ONI believes that these 
six sites constitute the “hard center” of filtering in Singapore; other sites are blocked intermittently or less 
uniformly by different ISPs.  Thus, ONI’s testing demonstrates that the state focuses its efforts on a small 
list of sites related to pornography and illegal drugs; similar content is readily available from other URLs 
in Singapore.  These results comport with the state’s claims to filter only a symbolic set of sites as a 
demonstration of Singapore’s disapproval of this type of material. 
 
B. Global List Results 
Our global list analysis includes testing 753 sites in 31 categories.
73  We tested this list once 
through proxy servers and twice from inside Singapore (on two different ISPs).  We found partial
74 
blocking of seven different sites (.9% of sites tested) in the categories of drugs (one site; 
www.cannabis.com), pornography (five sites; www.formatureaudiencesonly.com, www.penthouse.com, 
www.persiankitty.com, www.playboy.com, www.sex.com), and fanatical religion (one site; 
www.chick.com).  This limited blocking demonstrates that Singapore is concerned only with a few types of 
content.  The state does not attempt to prevent access to all sites with this material, since similar sites (for 
example, www.hustler.com and www.weedtalk.com) are readily accessible. 
 
C. Singapore-Specific Results 
To investigate Internet filtering on topics sensitive to Singapore, we tested two lists: a short, high-
impact list, and a longer list of sites related to separatist, paramilitary, military, intelligence, and political 
organizations.
75  Our high-impact testing found only two pornographic sites blocked, and our testing of 
the separatist / paramilitary list did not detect any filtering or blocking of these sites. 
 
1. High-Impact List 
From our high-impact testing, we conclude that Singapore focuses its attention primarily on 
pornography.  Of the 170 sites we tested, only two (1.2%) were blocked on any of the Singapore servers or 
ISP connections: www.playboy.com and www.playgirl.com.  Our testing did not uncover blocking of any 
other content, including that related to politics (such as political opposition or dissident sites), religion 
(evangelical and non-evangelical), gay and lesbian issues, Internet censorship circumvention, ethnicity, 
commentary and news, or non-governmental organizations.  Singapore’s pornographic filtering is limited; 
it does not attempt to block pornography generally, and does not affect sites that are commonly filtered by 
mistake when a state tries to prevent access to porn. 
 
                         
73 See Appendix 1 for categorized results of the global list testing.  To provide comparable results across multiple 
country studies, the majority of the sites in our global list have content only in English. 
74 A partial block is one where the URL was blocked on some, but not all, of the servers or Internet connections we 
tested on that network.  As described in Section III.C, we found inconsistent blocking on Singapore’s proxy servers. 
75 See Bob Cromwell, Separatist, Para-military, Military, Intelligence, and Political Organizations, at 
http://www.cromwell-intl.com/security/netusers.html (April 2004). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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2. SPMIPO List 
We tested a list of 711 sites with material related to separatist, military, paramilitary, intelligence, 
and political organizations (SPMIPO).  We did not find any of these sites blocked in Singapore. 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Singapore’s state-mandated filtering of Internet sites is quite limited.  Our testing found only six 
pornographic sites, one illegal drugs site, and one fanatical religion site blocked, and each of these sites 
could be reached in at least some of our tests.  Only six sites were blocked in more than one-third of our 
tests, including five pornographic sites.  We believe that these six sites are those most likely targeted for 
deliberate blocking by Singapore.  Moreover, similar content is readily available at other, unblocked sites.  
Thus, the state’s technological Internet censorship is minimal, reflecting the MDA’s professed symbolic 
commitment to preventing access to this type of material.   
However, ONI’s legal and background research demonstrates that Singapore uses other, non-
technological measures to prevent online posting of and access to certain material, particularly that 
related to political groups other than the People’s Action Party and to religious and ethnic conflict.  The 
threats of extremely high fines
76 or even criminal prosecution
77 as a result of defamation lawsuits, 
imprisonment without judicial approval under the Internal Security Act,
78and police monitoring of 
computer use
79 may deter users in Singapore from creating or obtaining access to potentially 
objectionable material.  Thus, Singapore’s filtering regime for political, religious, and ethnic material is 
primarily low-tech, yet nonetheless potentially effective. 
                         
76 See, e.g., Singapore Window, Singapore: Asia’s Cuba, at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020530hr.htm 
(2002) (describing how political opposition leader J.B. Jeyaretnam was bankrupted by damages levied against him in 
defamation proceedings). 
77 See Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press – 2002 : Singapore, at 
http://www.cpj.org/attacks03/asia03/singapore.html (2002) (noting a Muslim activist was forced to flee Singapore 
under threat of criminal prosecution for critical articles posted on a Web site). 
78 Reporters Sans Frontières, Singapore – 2004 Annual Report; see Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to 
Human Rights: Its Universal Application and the Singapore Example, 13 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y 257, 266 (2004). 
79 Reporters Sans Frontières, Parliament Grants Government Powers Tightening Internet Surveillance, at  
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8514&var_recherche=singapore (2003). Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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APPENDIX 1 
Global List Testing Results 
 
Category   Number of 
Sites 
Tested 
Number of Sites Blocked in 
Proxy Testing 
Number of Sites Blocked in In-
Country Testing 
Alcohol  22  0  0 
Anonymizers  21  0  0 
Blogging Domains  18  0  0 
Drugs  28  1 partial (www.cannabis.com)  0 
E-mail  20  0  0 
Encryption  8  0  0 
Entertainment  27  0   0 
Famous Bloggers  22  0  0 
Filtering Sites  8  0  0 
Free Web Space  11  0  0 
Gambling  26  0  0 
Gay / Lesbian / 
Bisexual / 
Transgender / Queer 
Issues 
38  0  0 
Government  57  0  0 
Groups (including 
Usenet) 
18  0  0 
Hacking  21  0  0 
Hate Speech  25  0  0 
Human Rights  26  0  0 
Humor  18  0  0 
Major Events  29  0  0 
Miscellaneous  10  0  0 
News Outlets  35  0  0 
Porn  36  4 partial (www.penthouse.com, 
www.persiankitty.com, 
www.playboy.com, www.sex.com) 
3 complete (www.penthouse.com, 
www.persiankitty.com, 
www.playboy.com), 2 partial 
(www.formatureaudiencesonly.com, 
www.sex.com) 
Provocative Attire  17  0  0 
Religion (fanatical)  9  0  1 (www.chick.com) 
Religion (normal)  52  0  0 Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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Search Engines  28  0  0 
Sex Education  28  0  0 
Translation Sites  13  0  0 
Universities  32  0  0 
Weapons / Violence  28  0  0 
Women’s Rights  27  0  0 
Total  753  5 partial (.66%)  4 complete (.53%), 2 partial 
(.26%) Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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APPENDIX 2 
High-Impact List Testing Results (Proxy and In-Country) 
 
Category  Number of 
Sites Tested 
Number of 
Sites Blocked 
Sites Blocked 
Blogs  7  0   
Dissidents  33  0   
Drugs  5  0   
Ethnicity  3  0   
Homosexuality  21  0   
Human Rights 
Organizations 
1  0   
General Commentary  5  0   
General Content  4  0   
General Religion  12  0   
International News  8  0   
Internet Censorship  3  0   
Miscellaneous  1  0   
Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
9  0   
Political Opposition  8  0   
Pornography  13  2 partial  www.playboy.com, www.playgirl.com
80 
Pornography Overblocking  10  0   
Religious Conflicts  2  0   
Religious Evangelism  4  0   
Satirical Commentary  5  0   
Sexual Content  5  0   
Singapore Factual 
Information 
2  0   
Singapore General Content  3  0   
Singapore Specific 
Commentary 
6  0   
Total  170  2 partial 
(1.2%) 
 
                         
80 www.playboy.com was generally blocked in both proxy and in-country tests, but www.playgirl.com was generally 
available during our in-country tests. Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
  19 
APPENDIX 3 
Copies of Block Pages from Singapore’s Filtering System 
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Figure 1 - StarHub Block Page 
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APPENDIX 4 
Singapore Background 
 
A. General Description 
The Republic of Singapore is a group of islands located off the coast of Malaysia, just north of 
Indonesia, in Southeast Asia.  It is one of the world’s most densely populated states, with 4.5 million 
citizens (as of July 2004) comprised of people of Chinese (77%), Malay (14%), Indian (8%), and other 
(1%) backgrounds.  Generally, the Chinese tend to practice Buddhism and the Malays Islam; Christians, 
Hindus, Sikhs, Taoists, and Confucianists make up the remainder of major religious groups.  This 
plurality of ethnicity and religion is reflected in the languages spoken: Malay is the national language, but 
Mandarin, Tamil, and English are also designated as official languages.  English is the language used for 
education, business, and government.  Literacy is high, and the infant mortality rate is lower than in the 
United States.
81  Singapore is one of the wealthiest countries in Asia, second only to Japan in per-capita 
income.  The state has a strong free-market economy, with electronics and manufacturing as key 
industries.
82  Although the global recession of 2001-2003 hurt the state’s electronics- and export-
dependent economy, unemployment remains low, prices are stable, and investment is high in Singapore’s 
relatively corruption-free business environment.
83  
Modern Singapore history began in 1819, when the British East India Company arrived.  The 
British bought the island in 1824, and Singapore was incorporated into the Straits Settlement.  During the 
1800s, Singapore developed into an important trading hub, attracting workers from nearby Malaysia and 
China.  In the 1920s and 1930s, the British built a number of naval and air bases on the island, only to 
have them overrun by Japanese forces in February 1942.  The British recaptured Singapore in September 
1945, and the island became a Crown Colony the next year.  The state attained self-governance in 1959, 
after nearly a decade of negotiations with the British (who would continue to control on the island’s 
internal affairs, security, and foreign policy).
84  In 1963, Singapore entered with Malaya, Sabah, and 
Sarawak to form the Federation of Malaysia.  This short-lived union deteriorated in 1965 when Singapore 
seceded due to political and ethnic hostilities, forming an independent republic.  As a result, relations 
with Malaysia remained tense through the 1970s.  Since the 1970s, Singapore has experienced remarkable 
growth, and in recent years the government has made clear its ambition to establish Singapore as the 
high-tech capital of Southeast Asia.
85 
                         
81 CIA, The World Factbook 2004 – Singapore, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sn.html#People. 
82 CIA, The World Factbook 2004 – Singapore, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sn.html. 
83 CIA, The World Factbook 2004 – Singapore, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sn.html#Econ. 
84 See, e.g., Asian Studies Network Information Center, University of Texas, Singapore: History, at 
http://reenic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/singapore/Singapore-History.html. 
85 See, e.g., InfoComm Development Authority, Connected Singapore, Apr. 8, 2003, at 
http://www.ida.gov.sg/idaweb/aboutida/infopage.jsp?infopagecategory=&infopageid=I2227&versionid=11 and 
International Telecommunication Union, Effective Regulation: Case Study – Singapore 2001 at 5.  Internet Filtering in Singapore in 2004-2005       
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B. Political System 
 
In principle, Singapore has a parliamentary system of government; authority rests in the prime 
minister and elected members of Parliament.  In practice, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has dominated 
Singapore since the state achieved independence and has often been accused of using authoritarian 
methods to maintain its position and suppress political opposition.  In Singapore’s first general election, 
the People’s Action Party won a supermajority of seats in the Legislative Assembly, and a PAP candidate, 
Lee Kuan Yew, became prime minister.  This marked the beginning of a period of one-party rule, and it 
was not until 1990 that Lee resigned (and did so only to transfer power to a PAP successor).  The PAP 
currently holds 81 of the 83 seats in Parliament, with the other two seats held by the socialist Worker’s 
Party and the liberal Singapore People’s Party.
86 
Though Singapore has achieved impressive economic growth, the PAP has faced international 
criticism for its suppression of political opposition, its enforcement of an unusually harsh penal code 
(including the death penalty and caning as punishments), and its heavy-handed management of the 
economy.
87  PAP candidates continue to enjoy the support of the electorate, but often run unopposed.  The 
prominent opposition Web site Sintercom recently complained that “Singaporeans have become so 
regulated that they have lost their initiative, their ability to make their own decisions and the spirit to take 
risks.”
88  Amnesty International reports that in 2004, “[f]reedom of expression continued to be curbed by 
restrictive legislation and by the threat of civil defamation suits against political opponents.”
89  Religious 
freedoms are also curbed: Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church are banned in Singapore, and 
the state imposes restrictions on forms of expression which it deems a threat to ethno-religious 
harmony.
90   
 
 
                         
86 CIA, The World Factbook 2004 – Singapore. 
87 See, e.g., Lim Siew Yea, Basic Policies of the People’s Action Party, at 
http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/singapore/government/lim1.html; Anita Zee, The PAP: No to Freedom of 
Speech and Opposition?, Sept. 27, 2001, at 
http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/01Pf/digmo270901.html; James Gomez, A Nation of 
Campaigns, Mar. 8, 2001, at http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/article.php?AID=66; and Amnesty International, 
Report 2004: Singapore, at http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/sgp-summary-eng. 
88 The PAP Dilemma, June 7, 2004, at http://www.newsintercom.org/index.php?itemid=63. 
89 Amnesty International, Report 2004: Singapore. 
90 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Singapore 2004. 